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Career criminals have been responsible for a high number of crimes out of 
proportion to their small numbers. Efforts to reduce the recidivism rate through 
intervention programs have not been effective. American law enforcement could be more 
effective if career criminals were targeted for special attention. Many law enforcement 
formats, such as community policing, problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led 
policing, are currently in use by American state, local, and tribal law enforcement 
agencies, and applying the use of intelligence practices to crime in these communities has 
become a focus of its law enforcement agencies. Can American law enforcement 
agencies use an intelligence community tool—the intelligence cycle—to deal with career 
criminals effectively? 
This thesis studies serious-offender programs and the use of the intelligence cycle 
by American intelligence agencies in order to create a model merging serious offender 
programs and intelligence cycles. It investigates serious-offender programs and finds that 
a lack of focus limited the use of the intelligence cycle within the American criminal 
justice system. This thesis concludes that the use of the intelligence cycle—specifically 
the FBI’s intelligence cycle’s six steps of requirements, planning and direction, 
collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination—can 
assist a law enforcement agency in focusing its efforts on career criminals. 
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Implementation of intervention programs among felons in correctional institutions 
has not been effective in reducing the rate of recidivism in the United States; some 
criminals continue to break the law in spite of their convictions and imprisonment. Law 
enforcement could be more effective if career criminals were targeted for special 
attention.  
Many law enforcement formats, such as community policing, problem-oriented 
policing and intelligence-led policing, are currently in use by American state, local, and 
tribal law enforcement agencies and applying the use of intelligence practices to crime in 
these communities has become a focus of its law enforcement agencies.  
Intelligence consists of information, analysis, and intelligence products. 
Information is facts, analysis is looking at those facts and determining if they are credible 
and relevant, and the intelligence product is analyzed facts. Intelligence is the product of 
an intelligence cycle. An intelligence cycle is an ongoing process in which information 
can be added to an evidentiary picture.  
Some types of intelligence-led policing incorporate a portion of the intelligence 
cycle into its methodology by using two steps of the cycle—collecting and analyzing 
crime information—in order to create an intelligence product for use in developing 
immediate law enforcement responses to crimes. With a structured and systematic 
process of information gathering integrated in American policing, the changing pattern of 
criminal acts committed by these habitual offenders can be predicted.  
Within this context, this thesis explores the application of the intelligence cycle in 
policing as a response to the changing face of crime and the growing interest toward a 
data-driven approach in crime case prioritization. Its research hopes to determine if the 
law enforcement use of the intelligence cycle is an effective strategy in dealing with 
career criminals. 
This thesis studies serious offender programs (Habitual Serious and Violent 
Juvenile Offender Programs and Repeat Offender Projects) and intelligence cycles 
 xiv 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, and Department of 
Homeland Security), and concludes with a recommended model for using the intelligence 
cycle in dealing with career criminals. This model will incorporate the steps of the 
intelligence cycle with the best practices of existing serious offender programs to focus 
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I. CAN LAW ENFORCEMENT BE INTELLIGENT?  
Gehring said that the ability of “specific institutional programs to keep offenders 
from reoffending is a measure of that program’s success,”1 and that the rate of recidivism 
that is used to judge the effectiveness of American criminal justice programs and 
institutions. Furthermore, in the absence of an estimate of the actual number of career 
criminals, the rate of recidivism is used to determine the estimated number of criminals 
committing habitual crimes.2 Also, decreases in incarceration rates indicate a reduction in 
the general crime rate.3 In fact, these imprisonment rates reflect a general decline in 
crime in America.  
The theory of career criminals was posited over 100 years ago but in spite of the 
large impact on society by such a low number of offenders, that very fact—a small 
population—did not merit a separate policy within the American criminal justice 
system4and the implementation of intervention programs among felons in correctional 
institutions has not been effective in reducing the rate of recidivism in the United States 
(U.S.). For instance, almost 46 percent of felons released from prison were returned 
within three years, according to a study by the Pew Center on the States, which collected 
data over a 10-year period.5 
Crime statistics alone “indicate that current law enforcement methods promote a 
high rate of violent crime by providing a small number of criminals with frequent 
                                                 
1 Thom Gehring, “Recidivism as a Measure of Correctional Education Program Success,” Journal of 
Correctional Education 51, no. 2 (June 2000): 157.  
2 Kristen M. Zgoba and Leonore M. J. Simon, “Recidivism Rates of Sexual Offenders Up to 7 Years 
Later: Does Treatment Matter?” Criminal Justice Review 30, no. 2 (2005): 155. 
3 Pew Center on the States, State of Recidivism: The Revolving Door of America’s Prisons 
(Washington, DC: The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2011), 5. 
4 Matt DeLisis and Michael Vaughn, “The Gottfredson—Hirschi Critiques Revisited, Reconciling Self 
Control Theory, Criminal Careers and Career Criminals,” International Journal of Offender Therapy and 
Comparative Criminology (2007). 
5 Pew Center on the States, State of Recidivism: The Revolving Door of America’s Prisons 
(Washington, DC: The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2011), 5. 
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opportunities to repeat their behavior.”6 That is, some criminals continue to break the law 
in spite of their convictions and imprisonment and the end of their incarceration gives 
these criminals the chance to return to their previous lifestyle. With a structured and 
systematic process of information gathering integrated into American policing, the 
pattern of criminal acts committed by these habitual offenders can be predicted. 
Law enforcement could be more effective if offenders determined to be career 
criminals or habitual offenders were targeted for special attention in the form of intensive 
information gathering about their criminal behavior, surveillance, and close work with a 
prosecutor to ensure that subsequent arrests are presented in court.  
Many law enforcement formats, such as community policing, problem-oriented 
policing and intelligence-led policing (ILP), are currently in use by American state, local, 
and tribal law enforcement agencies and applying the use of intelligence practices to 
crime in these communities has become a focus of its law enforcement agencies.7 The 
intelligence cycle is a process of receiving direction from a client; the collection of 
information in response to the client’s direction or question; the analyzing the collected 
information in order to determine its credibility and value to the client; and the 
production of a prediction in answer to the client’s question. 
Some types of intelligence-led policing incorporates a portion of the intelligence 
cycle into its methodology by using two steps of the cycle—collecting and analyzing 
crime information—in order to create an intelligence product for use in developing 
immediate law enforcement responses to crimes.8 American intelligence agencies have 
developed intelligence cycles that use five or six steps and using all the steps of these 
cycles creates a product that is true to the client’s needs. Using the intelligence cycle as 
an ongoing process seeks continuous input that meets rigorous professional standards 
                                                 
6 Philip Cohen, Stefan Possony, and B. Ray, “Repeat Offenders and Career Criminal Programs,” in 
Forgotten Victims—An Advocate’s Anthology, ed. George Nicholson, Thomas Condit, and Stuart 
Greenbaum (Sacramento, CA: California District Attorney’s Association, 1977), 215. 
7 David L. Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: a Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law 
Enforcement Agencies, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2009), 4. 
8 Ibid., 80. 
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thus adding new information to the overall evidentiary picture.9 This evidentiary picture 
stands on data collected and used by law enforcement agencies to mainly determine 
where crime is occurring. However, the advent of intelligence-led policing has brought 
calls for its use in law enforcement standard operating procedures. 
The United States National Criminal Intelligence-Sharing Plan advocates that 
every American Law enforcement agency—regardless of the number of officers or 
deputies within its ranks, or the size of the population or territory that it serves—refine its 
ability to analyze information and create actionable intelligence products.10 There is no 
direction within the plan to use the intelligence cycle, though. But, a 2012 U.S. DOJ 
review of domestic law enforcement agencies engaged in intelligence-led policing found 
that successful intelligence-led programs included the “collection of critical information 
related to targeted criminality”11 (a step of the intelligence cycle) while identifying 
“individuals for whom there is a reasonable suspicion of a relationship to a crime.”12 
A. QUESTION 
Within this context, this thesis explores the application of the intelligence cycle in 
policing as a response to the changing face of crime and the growing interest in a data-
driven approach in crime case prioritization.13 Is the law enforcement use of the 
intelligence cycle an effective strategy when dealing with career criminals? Furthermore, 
can the application of the intelligence cycle in American law enforcement reduce crime?  
B. METHOD 
This thesis studies serious offender programs (Habitual Serious and Violent 
Juvenile Offender Programs (HSVJOP) and Repeat Offender Projects (ROP) and 
                                                 
9 Jerry Ratcliffe, Intelligence-led Policing (Cullompton Devon: Willian, 2003). 
10 Bureau of Justice Programs, Reducing Crime Through Intelligence Led Policing (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Justice, 2012), 13. 
11 Ibid., 4. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement 
Agencies, 74. 
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intelligence cycles (Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  
These programs and intelligence cycles were chosen because they are used by 
American law enforcement agencies and therefore their universal features create 
opportunities to find similarities and differences. While “one model of the intelligence 
cycle is not ‘better’ than the other; rather, they are just slightly different approaches based 
on” an agency’s client’s needs.14 
For the sake of this thesis, intelligence consists of information, analysis, and 
intelligence products. Information is facts, analysis is looking at those facts and 
determining if they are credible and relevant, and the intelligence product is analyzed 
facts. Intelligence is the product of an intelligence cycle. An intelligence cycle is an 
ongoing process that meets set standards in which information can be added to an 
evidentiary picture.  
With these comparisons, this researcher created a model that merges serious 
offender programs and intelligence cycles, which will incorporate the best practices 
found and lessons learned from this study.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature about domestic intelligence in the United States can be broken into two 
areas of study: federal intelligence operations and law enforcement intelligence 
operations. Researcher Andrew Miller bemoaned the “broad and eclectic nature of 
intelligence research,”15 which reflects the varied ends sought in intelligence. Law 
enforcement seeks to prosecute crimes with the intelligence it gathers while the federal 
intelligence community (IC) seeks to prevent crimes (terrorism) with the intelligence it 
gathers.  
                                                 
14 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement 
Agencies, 74. 
15 Andrew Miller, “Homeland Security Intelligence: To What End?”(master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2010). 
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David Carter warns that the intelligence process should not be confused with 
intelligence product. He described intelligence product as the “end product of an analytic 
process that evaluates information collected from diverse sources; integrates the relevant 
information into a logical package; and produces a conclusion, estimate, or forecast about 
a criminal phenomenon by using the scientific approach to problem solving.”16 The base 
description of the intelligence process is found in the intelligence cycle. 
Variations of the intelligence process exist but the National Criminal Intelligence 
Sharing Plan was cited by Carter: (1) planning and direction, (2) collection, (3) 
processing/collation, (4) analysis, (5) dissemination, and (6) reevaluation.17 These steps 
are found in the intelligence cycle. Regardless, all intelligence practitioners—federal or 
local—need to use the same terms, this paper will show that this is not so. 
Literary descriptions of federal domestic intelligence operations tend to be limited 
to the FBI and the CIA. The FBI’s counter terrorism mission is highlighted in the 
material, as is the CIA’s limited ability to engage in its counter terrorism mission in the 
United States in that the CIA is limited in its mission as it can only operate in America to 
recruit foreign citizens in the United States for its efforts abroad. 
There are accounts as to what went wrong in the U.S. IC prior to September 11, 
2001. The 9/11 Commission Report stated that “institutions charged with protecting our 
borders, civil aviation, and national security did not understand how grave this (terrorism) 
threat could be and did not adjust their policies, plans, and practices to deter and defeat 
it.”18 
Much was written about leadership, or the lack thereof in the federal intelligence 
arena. Jennifer Sims and Burton Gerber found that the need for leadership was critical in 
                                                 
16 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement 
Agencies, 9. 
17 Ibid., 57. 
18 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, Final Report of the National Commission of Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2004), xvi. 
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the “difficult domain of domestic intelligence.”19 Henry Crumpton also found a lack of 
leadership in U.S. domestic intelligence. He said that the United States public responded 
to a need for domestic intelligence by: (1) ignoring it, (2) seeking ad hoc arrangements 
without clear authority or oversight, (3) allowing our foreign intelligence arm, the CIA, to 
operate illegally within the United States, and (4) allowing law enforcement (federal, 
state, and or local) to substitute for intelligence operations.20 
Descriptions of U.S. domestic intelligence operations include comparisons to 
other countries’ efforts. James Burch compared the British, Indian, and Australian 
domestic intelligence agencies to a proposed American domestic intelligence agency. He 
chose these three countries because they are democracies comparable to the United 
States’ government. Burch proposed that such an American agency should have (1) 
oversight by the executive, judicial, and legislative branches, (2) coordination by the 
executive branch, and (3) a separation of foreign and domestic intelligence within the 
agency.21 It is interesting to note that, despite the separate missions of the CIA and the 
FBI, Burch’s recommendations are carried out in the United States. He just argued for 
one domestic intelligence agency to fulfill the mission. 
Crumpton also argued for a federal intelligence system within the domestic 
arena.22 Former CIA Deputy Director Mark Lowenthal said that such a system started 
with Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), “which improved relationships between federal 
counter terrorism efforts and local law enforcement,”23 though he found that most of 
America’s JTTFs tended to be staffed with state law enforcement personnel, thus 
                                                 
19 Gerber Burton and Jennifer Sims, “Meeting the Challenge: Action Now,” in Transforming U.S. 
Intelligence, ed. Gerber Buron and Jennifer Sims (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 
268.  
20 Henry Crumpton, “Intelligence and Homeland Defense,” in Transforming U.S. Intelligence, ed. 
Gerber Buron and Jennifer Sims (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 206.  
21 James Burch, “A Domestic Intelligence Agency for the United States? A Comparative Analysis of 
Domestic Intelligence Agencies and Their Implications for Homeland Security) Homeland Security Affairs 
3, art. 2 (2007), www.hsaj.org. 
22 Crumpton, “Intelligence and Homeland Defense,” 207. 
23 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence from Secrets to Policy (Los Angeles: Sage CQ Press, 2012), 284. 
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defeating a local and federal liaison. However, Crumpton found that the JTTF was more 
“global than local.”24 
Scott and Jackson said that “intelligence and security issues are now more 
prominent than ever in Western political discourse, as well as the wider public 
consciousness.”25 Carter wrote, “effective law enforcement intelligence operations are 
sometimes confusing to understand, frequently controversial, and often challenging to 
implement.”26 
Carter found that law enforcement intelligence operations are “confusing” 
because many Americans do not find the differences “between law enforcement 
intelligence and national security intelligence.”27 Intelligence is a generic term used by 
the media, among others, to describe a wide body of activities.  
 Carter said that law enforcement intelligence was “controversial…because of a 
checkered history of intelligence activities”28 and that law enforcement intelligence was 
difficult because of the need to change processes and interagency relationships to 
maximize effective information sharing. Lowenthal wondered if the IC was “doing its 
job, why have congressional hearings?”29 
Policing in the United States followed several models in 20th century: traditional 
policing, problem solving policing, community policing and intelligence-led policing. 
Traditional policing incorporated a professional police department that stood distant from 
the public in an effort to reduce corruption. Problem solving policing focused on 
identifying people or places that contributed to disorder and used analysis in restoring 
order. Community policing used problem solving policing and community members and 
or associations to restore order. ILP is discussed below. 
                                                 
24 Crumpton, “Intelligence and Homeland Defense,” 207. 
25 Peter Jackson and Len Scott, “The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice,” Intelligence and 
National Security 19, no. 2 (2004): 139.  




29 Lowenthal, Intelligence from Secrets to Policy, 47. 
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In recent years, police chiefs and sheriffs across the nation have asserted that local 
law enforcement is first “in the effort to keep our nation safe from terrorism,”30 meaning 
that local law enforcement is now obliged to understand homeland security and to apply 
its tenets in daily operations.  
Most information about local law enforcement intelligence operations is found in 
the category of ILP. While the origins of ILP are indistinct, the first references to the 
subject were found in the United Kingdom in the 1980s when there were calls for “more 
effective and more cost-efficient”31 policing. Mark Reibling describes ILP as an Israeli 
policing initiative in which investigating an incident is secondary to collecting 
intelligence.32 
The U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance, a component of the Office of Justice 
Programs, within the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) defined ILP as a “collaborative 
law enforcement approach combining problem solving policing, information sharing and 
police accountability, with enhanced intelligence operations.”33 David Carter wrote that 
ILP “provides strategic integration of intelligence into the overall mission”34 of the law 
enforcement organization. However, Nina Cope warned that analysis was the most 
crucial component of intelligence-led policing.35 
An analysis of the themes found in this literature review shows a lack of study in 
the field of domestic intelligence. This lack may be the result of confusion about the 
difference between process and product. The application of the intelligence process is 
                                                 
30 Matthew Simeone, “Integrating Virtual Public-Private Partnerships into Local Law Enforcement for 
Enhanced Intelligence-Led Policing,” in Homeland Security Affairs, Proceedings of the Center for the 
Homeland Defense and Security Annual Conference (April 2008), http://www.hsaj.org/articles/135. 
31 Jerry Ratcliffe, Intelligence Led Policing (Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, no. 248) 
(Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2003), 241–260. 
32 Mark Reibling, Hard Won Lessons: The New Paradigm—Merging Law Enforcement and 
Counterterrorism Strategies (New York: Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, 2006), 3. 
33 Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Navigating Your Agency’s Path to Intelligence Led 
Policing (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice, 
2009).  
34 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement 
Agencies, 79. 
35 Nina Cope, “Intelligence Led Policing or Policing Led Intelligence,” British Journal of Criminology 
44, no 2 (2004): 189.  
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found in the intelligence cycle, while the application of intelligence product is not clear in 
the literature. This may be due to the lack of public knowledge about successes and 
failures within the American intelligence community. The review highlighted the limited 
roles of the FBI and the CIA in domestic intelligence operations. Burch proposed a 
remedy to these limitations in the creation of one American domestic intelligence agency. 
Lowenthal claimed that America is on its way to a better domestic intelligence operation 
using Joint Terrorism Task Forces.  
Leadership is the second theme found in this literature review: it was deemed 
crucial to success and found not to be up to expectations.  
This review found much knowledge about the intelligence process and its 
attendant procedures. This is logical because the use of process and procedures leads to 
increased understanding and definitions within the intelligence community, such 
understanding lessens mystery and the release of these processes and procedures into the 
public domain does not threaten intelligence operations. 
The review did not find much reporting about the magnitude of the American 
Intelligence Community’s successes and failures. This, too, is logical as broadcasting 
intelligence failures and successes jeopardizes current intelligence operations as such 
knowledge could confirm foreign countries’ and non-state entities’ suspicions of 
American intelligence community’s methods and operations. 
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II. CRIME AND SOCIETY 
Societies exist in order for their members to benefit from collective efforts that 
individual efforts cannot attain. Universal societal collective efforts include institutions, 
such as family, religion, schools, transportation, and government, among other things. 
Institutions, such as criminal justice and national defense, are products of government 
efforts to protect society and its members from harm. This chapter addresses an 
intersection of criminal justice—in the form of dealing with career criminals—and 
national security—in the form of the intelligence cycle.  
Both institutions, the criminal justice system and the national security apparatus, 
appear to be monoliths, but casual study shows that there are local influences on both. 
For instance, one can be incarcerated in jail for one year and or fined up to $6,000 for 
possessing any amount (for personal use as opposed to possession with the intent to sell) 
of marijuana in Alabama,36 while that same person can legally possess up to one ounce 
of marijuana in Colorado.  
In another example, in California, federal (DHS) transportation security agents 
screen passengers and their baggage at the Los Angeles International Airport, while 350 
miles to the north the same service is conducted by a private security company, Covenant 
Aviation Security, at the San Francisco International Airport. In the first case, the federal 
government itself – with its bureaucracy and its chain of command—protects the flying 
public, and in the second case a private company—with presumed allegiances to its 
owners – provides the same protection.   
Rules, or better yet, laws, based on values and norms are the foundation of a 
criminal justice system. Values, “the collective conception of what is considered good, 
desirable and proper,”37 are the foundation of norms within a society. Values identify 
what is judged as good or evil within a society. Values are components of norms, the 
                                                 
36 Alabama Code, Section 13A-12-214: Unlawful Possession of Marihuana in the Second Degree. 
37 J. Richard Hackman, “Group Influences on Individuals in Organizations,” in Handbook of 
Industrial and Organizational Psychology, ed. Marvin D. Dunette and Leatta M. Hough, 2nd ed., vol. 3 
(Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press, 1992), 234. 
 12 
latter being “group held beliefs about how (its) members should behave in a given 
context.”38  
Norms promote social control by giving individuals physical or psychological 
resources from group membership. Members of groups “internalize norms by accepting 
them.”39 Norms are not traditions, but are “beliefs passed down within a group or society 
with symbolic meaning or special significance with origins in the past.”40  
Norms are a source of laws41 and some laws describe crimes: “any act committed 
in violation of a law that prohibits it and authorizes punishment for its commission.”42 
Crimes can be classified into at least two general categories: “malum in se” and “malum 
prohibitum.” Malum in se (Latin for wrong in itself) offenses are “naturally evil, as 
adjudged by the sense of a civilized community,”43 and are acts traditionally considered 
as crimes because they violate the principles of a civilized society. A malum prohibitum 
(Latin for wrong [as] prohibited) “offense is wrong because a statute makes it so.”44 One 
can see how some of these distinctions apply in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports 
(UCR), which lists criminal offenses into two major groups: Part I offenses and Part II 
offenses.45 
The first half (four of eight) of the UCR’s Part I offenses—criminal homicide, 
forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault—are obvious malum in se crimes in that 
they clearly violate principals of civilized society by taking another’s life, or by sexually 
                                                 
38 “Norm (Social),” accessed October 15, 2015, www.worldheritage.org/article/whebn0000043851/ 
norm%20(social).  
39 Hackman, “Group Influences on Individuals in Organizations,” 234. 
40 Thomas Green, ed. Folklore, An Encyclopedia of Beliefs, Customs, Tales, Music, Art (Santa 
Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1997), 800. 
41 Richard A. Posner, “Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach,” The American Economic 
Review 87, no. 2 (May 1997): 365.  
42 James Q. Wilson and Richard J. Herrnstein, Crime and Human Nature, The Defensive Study of the 
Causes of Crime (New York: The Free Press, 1985), 22. 
43 State of Washington v. Thaddius X. Anderson, Supreme Court of the State of Washington, 67826-0, 
(August 2000). 
44 Ibid. 
45 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook (Washington, DC: United 
States Department of Justice, 2004). 
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assaulting another person, or by taking another’s property by force, or by creating serious 
injury.  
The repercussions of these crimes resonate within civil society by causing alarm 
to victims and their families as well to the general public. The UCR 21 Part II offenses 
range from forgery to runaway juveniles and can be considered malum prohibitum 
offenses in that they generally do not involve immediate injury or damage to others. 
Moreover, what was a crime yesterday is not a crime today. The path to that end 
varies: decriminalization and legalization are two methods of changing laws. 
Decriminalization is a process of removing criminal charges for certain actions, while 
leaving associated laws and regulations in effect and legalization removes a prohibition 
from the illegal act.  
For instance, the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution created 
Prohibition, a “nationwide ban on the sale, production, importation, and transportation of 
alcoholic beverages from 1920 to 1933.”46 The U.S. Senate proposed Prohibition in 1917 
and thirty-six states approved the amendment within thirteen months, thus ratifying it. 
The amendment went into effect in January 1920 and remained a law until December 
1933 when the Twenty-first Amendment repealed it. Today, the UCR crimes pertaining 
to alcohol—driving under the influence, liquor laws, drunkenness, and disorderly 
conduct—are malum prohibitum offenses. However, why do people commit crimes, 
regardless of universal proscription or manmade rules? 
Wilson and Herrnstein theorized that a “person will do that thing the 
consequences of which are perceived by him or her to be preferable to the consequences 
of doing something else.”47 In other words, at any given time, a person can choose 
between committing a crime and not committing a crime if the reward in committing the 
crime is desirable. While other factors contribute to crime—employment, the 
effectiveness of social institutions (such as the criminal justice system, schools, and 
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family), and drug use—it is a person’s sense of the potential consequences suffered in 
committing a crime that is the most powerful factor in explaining crime. Wilson and 
Herrnstein argue that people develop their own “human nature…out of a complex 
interaction of…social factors” and that “this nature affects how people choose between 
the consequences of crime and its alternatives.”48 
And so, society treats crimes distinctly by enacting differing punishments. The 
most serious punishment—death—is used for murder, although California law allows an 
inmate serving a life sentence “who commits an assault with a deadly weapon or 
instrument or by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury to suffer capital 
punishment.”49 In effect, this law allows the State of California to use the death penalty 
in a case that did not result in a death. Regardless, it is safe to assume that all of the 
inmates on California’s death row are there for murder, not assault. One suspects that the 
norms and values of the California correctional officers were applied in creating this law 
as it protects prison guards from being assaulted by prisoners on Death Row with nothing 
to lose. 
Some crimes do not merit incarceration and are punishable by fines; these 
infractions are at the lower end of the spectrum of crimes. Moreover, while there are 
different degrees of murder on the books, there are different degrees of criminals as well. 
While the distinction between felons and misdemeanants is found in the place and length 
of punishment, there are criminals who repeatedly offend and are labeled habitual 
offenders or career criminals. 
In a 2003 case, Gary Ewing v. the State of California, U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor found that the career criminals posed the “greatest threat to 
society.”50 The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in that case went on to declare that “the 
state of California has a reasonable basis for believing that dramatically enhanced 
sentences for habitual felons advances the goals of its criminal justice system in a 
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substantial way because it reflects a rational legislative judgment that offenders who have 
committed serious or violent felonies must be incapacitated.”51 While this case defended 
California’s right to imprison an offender for continually committing crimes, it did not 
define the career criminal. 
The State of California describes the career criminal as a person who has served 
two or more prior separate prison terms for a variety of crimes that include murder, 
attempted murder, manslaughter, rape, oral copulation, sodomy, arson, escape, and or 
bombing.52 New York State’s penal article 70.10 declares that a “persistent felony 
offender is a person convicted of a felony having previously been convicted of two or 
more felonies.”53 Matt DeLisis wrote that the “gold standard marker to delineate whether 
one is a habitual or career criminal is five or more police contacts or arrests.”54 Since 
1965, New York has had a discretionary “Three Strikes and You’re Out” statute, which 
allows a judge to sentence a convicted defendant to life in prison and or parole for life if 
that person had been convicted of two non-violent felonies.55  
It was Wolfgang’s Delinquency in a Birth Cohort that increased mid-20th century 
knowledge of habitual offenders by studying almost 10,000 Philadelphia males, all born 
in 1945, who lived in that city during their preteen and teenage years. Wolfgang and his 
associates declared that a person with “five or more police contacts” were “chronic or 
habitual offenders.”56 As stated above, DeLisis agreed with Wolfgang. 
As to the impact of career criminals on society, research has found that a fair 
share of crime is committed by “less than ten percent of the population,”57 and anywhere 
from seventy to one hundred percent of America’s serious crimes—murder, rape, 
kidnapping, robbery, burglary and aggravated assault—are committed by this ten 
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percent.58 In conclusion, a criminal justice system that focuses on these ten percent 
would be beneficial to society as this group accounts for most of America’s serious 
crime.59 
The next chapter will discuss intelligence as a process and a product; the 
intelligence cycle; and the use of intelligence by American law enforcement agencies. 
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III. INTELLIGENCE AND THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE  
Intelligence cycles are the foundation for intelligence operations. An intelligence 
operation for an agency is an on-going operation and should contain a mission statement, 
oversight procedures, a nexus to hazards, a process for collecting information, and a 
records retention policy.  
A mission statement should state the purpose of the operation; typically answered 
in the intelligence cycle’s requirements step. An oversight procedure could include 
civilian review of law enforcement intelligence cycles, or a U.S. Attorney General review 
in the FBI’s case. A nexus to a hazard—a threat to national security or a criminal act—
should be established in the intelligence operation.  
The intelligence cycle’s requirements step describes the standing needs of the 
agency and or the needs of its client (the President of the United States is the first client 
of the CIA). This would guide the intelligence operation’s process for collecting 
information through open sources or covert means.  
A good records retention policy is important in maintaining public trust as the 
question of what is done with the information once it is analyzed is answered in such a 
policy: it defines classification of intelligence, sets a records destruction schedule, and 
obeys court evidentiary rules. 
Intelligence can be many things. Sherman Kent wrote that intelligence has three 
separate definitions: knowledge (the information that one must have for proper decision 
making); institution (the physical organizations of people who are pursuing a certain type 
of knowledge); and activity (the actions of collection, evaluation, research, analysis, 
study and presentation).60 While all three are necessary for institutional success, 
“intelligence is best described as an analytic process that evaluates information collected 
from diverse sources; integrates the relevant information into a logical package; and 
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produces a conclusion, estimate, or forecast about a phenomenon by using the scientific 
approach to problem solving.”61 
In seeking the history of intelligence Jock Haswell found that the earliest recorded 
intelligence report, dated some 2,000 years before Christ, was written on a clay tablet by 
a man named Bannum, commanding a desert patrol, to his lord in Mari, beside the 
Euphrates River, where it (the tablet) was found. It stated that the border villages of the 
Benjamites were exchanging fire signals, and though the significance of them was not yet 
known, Bannum intended to find out what was going on. He recommended that the 
guards on Mari’s city walls should be strengthened.62  
Among similar records found in the Hittite capital of Chattusas was a tablet of 
about 1370 BCE relating to the widow of Tutankhamun who had suggested that the 
Hittites, menacing the Egyptian frontier, might provide her with another husband. The 
Hittite Prince Mursilis dispatched his chamberlain Hattu-Zitis to Egypt with instructions 
to find out whether the request was genuine or part of a plot. “Bring me back reliable 
information,”63 wrote Mursilis. 
Intelligence should be differentiated from information. Information is unevaluated 
material of every type, while intelligence is the product that is derived from the cyclical 
processing of information, but it is not evidence.64 Ormand wrote that prediction is the 
desired end of intelligence activity, as the basic purpose of intelligence today is to help 
“improve the quality of decision making by reducing ignorance.”65 Intelligence work 
encompasses all the processes that ensure that as much as possible of the right 
information is available at the right time.  
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So, if intelligence is “when a wide array of new information is assessed for 
validity and reliability, reviewed for materiality to the issues at question and given 
meaning through the application of inductive or deductive logic,”66 and given Carter’s 
claim that American criminal justice intelligence is “the product of an analytic process 
that provides an integrated perspective to disparate information about crime, crime 
trends, crime and security threats and conditions associated with criminality,”67 then all 
American law enforcement agencies (local, regional, tribal, and federal) engage in 
domestic intelligence operations.  
Of course, the FBI and the DHS routinely carry out American federal domestic 
intelligence operations and fusion centers—information-sharing centers—participate in 
domestic intelligence operations by receiving, reviewing and disseminating intelligence 
requests and products from and to federal, state, regional and local law enforcement 
agencies.68  
However, there are circumstances wherein American law enforcement agencies 
engage in intelligence operations and do not call their efforts intelligence operations. For 
instance, American custodial (prisons and jails) agencies routinely question new inmates 
about gang affiliations during intake interviews.69 Furthermore, American police and 
sheriff departments monitor organized crime, prison gangs, street gangs and narcotics 
traffickers; yet these operations are not deemed intelligence operations because 
intelligence operations have been cause for governmental scrutiny.70 
This scrutiny may have caused American law enforcement agencies to refrain 
from truly owning their intelligence operations. Media and politicians sometimes posture 
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at the expense of law enforcement intelligence operations and so the intelligence 
operations may be hidden in gang task forces and narcotics operations.  
Allen Dulles wrote that an intelligence agency has so many interests that logic 
dictates some form of order is necessary to collect information.71 The use of the 
intelligence cycle creates such order. Michael Warner found the first mention of the 
intelligence cycle in Robert R. Glass and Philip B. Davidson’s “Intelligence is for 
Commanders.”72 Their cycle consisted of directing the collection effort, processing the 
collected information, and using the resulting intelligence products. The steps of the 
contemporary intelligence cycle—direction by policy makers, collection of information 
(electronically or personally), processing of the information (interpretation of data 
generated by collection activities and systems), analysis of the information (identifying 
data’s implications for wider judgments and contextual issues that the collected “raw” 
information is supposed to clarify) and dissemination (giving the policy makers an 
intelligence product)—have been in use for almost three quarters of a century in 
America.73 A better description of the process is that the steps of the cycle are the core 
functions of the intelligence process. 
The intelligence cycle may appear to be a simple process of following one step at 
a time but these steps may overlap, double back and jump over each other.74 Intelligence 
staffs are confronted with increased risks of intelligence overload because of the volume 
of data increasingly available and the availability of information does not conform to 
traditional military or law enforcement staff silos or chains of command.75 In spite of 
these qualifications, the steady application of the intelligence cycle’s basic activities of 
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direction, collection, analyzing, and production may work for long standing social ills 
such as chronic crime in a particular neighborhood.76 
A quick glance at the CIA, FBI, and DHS websites show that they use the 
intelligence cycle but Hulnick argues, “it is not a particularly good model since the 
cyclical pattern does not describe what really happens.”77 He wrote that “policy officials 
rarely give collection guidance,”78 and he found that two of the primary steps of the 
intelligence cycle—collection and analysis—work more efficiently simultaneously rather 
than sequentially. Hulnick worried that policy makers failed to wait for a thorough 
analysis of the information collected and that today’s decision makers “seem to want 
intelligence to support policy”79 rather than waiting for the intelligence cycle’s analysis 
to inform policy. The CIA’s Allen Dulles found that policy-makers tend to become 
wedded to the policy for which they are responsible.80 
The CIA and the FBI use two similar intelligence cycles. The CIA intelligence 
cycle contains five steps: planning and direction, collection, processing, analysis and 
production, and dissemination.81 The FBI intelligence cycle contains six steps: 
requirements, planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis 
and production, and dissemination.82 The FBI intelligence cycle has subsets within half 
of its steps; it is a richer and deeper process. 
Past domestic intelligence operations in the United States had questionable or no 
oversight, no direction in the form of mission statements, questionable uses of 
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information, and a lack of structured analysis of gathered information in an attempt to 
create intelligence.  
Publicized successes of intelligence operations, when practicable, concerning 
threats to public safety and national security engenders respect for intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies and thus intelligence operations and there are intelligence 
operations that occur routinely within American law enforcement without 
acknowledgement, too. 
These routine domestic intelligence operations occur in the realm of correctional 
security: prison and jail intake interviews in order to reduce inmate attacks and escapes. 
And intelligence operations aimed at criminal gangs—motorcycle gangs, African 
American gangs, Hispanic gangs, prison gangs—or narcotics intelligence operations are 
not questioned by the public. 
Most importantly, transparency makes domestic intelligence operations 
acceptable to the American public. Transparency engenders trust when people can see 
that there is oversight and a well-defined records retention policy.  
In spite of misgivings, such as Hulnick’s, about the intelligence cycle, let us not 
forget the United States National Criminal Intelligence-Sharing Plan, which implicitly 
calls for the use of the intelligence cycle. 
So, we see the dynamics of the intelligence cycle in intelligence-led policing, 
which can eventually render “analytic products related to (criminal) threats”83 for 
distribution to law enforcement officers and investigators for use in preventing crime and 
arresting offenders.  
Also, using the intelligence cycle to focus law enforcement efforts on career 
criminals can fall in line with the national criminal intelligence-sharing plan: Denise 
O’Donnell, Director of the United States Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice 
Assistance wrote that “successful data driven strategies such as hot-spot policing, 
problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing use the work of crime analysts to 
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reduce crime by focusing resources on high-crime places, high-risk offenders, and repeat 
victims.”84  
This point is reminiscent of Cohen and Felson’s routine activity approach to 
criminality,85 which has been explained with a crime triangle—each leg representing 
crime’s location, perpetrator, and victim—just as O’Donnell’s three focal points. This 
illuminates the basic elements of criminal theory: crime occurs somewhere and is 
perpetrated by someone on another being or place. Using the intelligence cycle to guide 
law enforcement agencies in their endeavor to address crime may be effective. 
The next chapter will look at an American juvenile habitual offender program—
the HSVJOP—which closely models adult serious offender programs, and later 
determine the practicality of using the program in conjunction with the intelligence cycle 
in addressing juvenile crime.   
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IV. THE JUVENILE OFFENDER  
There are many reasons for paying attention to juvenile delinquency; it “puts a 
youth at risk for drug use and dependency, school drop-out, incarceration, injury, early 
pregnancy, and adult criminality.”86 As most adults who have been incarcerated started 
their criminal careers as juveniles, it would behoove society to prevent juvenile 
delinquency in order to “reduce the burden of crime on its victims and society”87 
Juvenile crime is differentiated from juvenile delinquency, in that crime, an act prohibited 
by written law, becomes known when it is reported to authorities and delinquency is 
merely failing to do what duty or law requires. Crime is tangible in many ways including 
arrest statistics and “arrest statistics have been used as the main barometer of juvenile 
delinquent activity, (but) many juvenile offenses go unreported and do not become a part 
of the national statistical picture.”88 This may be so because “offenses committed by 
juveniles are considered part of growing up and are handled informally, rather than by 
arrest and adjudication.”89 Nevertheless, juveniles were involved in one quarter of 
serious violent crimes (incidents involving rape and other sexual assaults; robbery and 
aggravated assaults) over the past twenty-five years. While homicide was not included in 
that data set, it was reported that an estimated 14,212 persons were murdered in the 
United States90 in 2011 and that juvenile offenders were involved in at least 680 of those 
murders.91 There are many theories about criminality: poverty versus riches, nature 
versus nurture, etc., but there are fewer about juvenile delinquency.  
Peter Greenwood, Executive Director of the Association for the Advancement of 
Evidence Based Practices, stated that past efforts to frustrate delinquency were mostly 
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guided by theories about the causes of delinquent behavior, but there was no 
determination if those efforts achieved the desired effects. Greenwood found that “the 
primary causes of delinquency were the juvenile’s homes or neighborhood, or lack of 
socializing experiences, or lack of job opportunities, or the labeling effects of the juvenile 
justice system.”92 He said that these four factors plus one’s offense history are the major 
predictors of a juvenile’s recidivism.93 This re-offending is the bane of our society 
because, for as stated earlier, juvenile delinquency leads to adult criminality.  
In 1992, the American violent crime rate hit a peak of 757.7 per 100,000 
population—it has since declined to 386.9 per 100,000 population94—and during the 
early 1990s there was no clarity in preventing or stopping juvenile delinquency. 
Greenwood wrote, “the preventive strategies promoted by (past) theories included the 
removal of urban children to rural settings, enrollment in residential training schools, 
industrial schools, summer camps, job programs, and diversion from juvenile justice 
systems.”95 He found that none of these strategies was helpful. A 1994 systemic review 
of the nation’s juvenile justice systems conducted by the National Research Council 
concurred with Greenwood.96 
Howell and Lipsey wrote that by the beginning of the 21st century “every state 
had enacted laws that made their juvenile justice systems more punitive or made it 
easier”97 to transfer youthful offenders from juvenile courts to adult courts and that these 
changes in the law also brought more the young offenders in the states juvenile justice 
systems, thus designating more of these defendants as “serious and violent offenders,” 
which resulted in the “incarceration of more juveniles.”98 
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These changes “extended periods of confinement” for juvenile offenders and 
“expanded the lists of crimes” for which juvenile offenders could be considered as adult 
offenders. At the same time, other changes “lowered the ages at which juvenile offenders 
could be transferred to the adult criminal justice system, thus excluding more juvenile 
offenders from juvenile court jurisdictions.”99 The more punitive approaches had not 
been effective in reducing juvenile delinquency; in fact, “some of them—shock 
incarceration and boot camp—actually increased antisocial behavior and recidivism.”100  
One juvenile offender program that occurred in the 1980s was the HSVJOP. The 
HSVJOP reduced crime at the time by incarcerating juveniles (in the past a perceived 
juvenile crime problem had been dealt with by increasing punishment101) but the reactive 
policies inherent in it did nothing to prevent delinquency. 
The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), under the 
U.S. DOJ, established the JSVJOP in 1984. The program was designed to allow the 
selective criminal prosecution of serious, repeat juvenile offenders. It was modeled in 
part after career criminal programs designed to prosecute chronic adult offenders. Under 
the HSVJOP, experienced prosecutors handled serious juvenile cases with vertical and 
accelerated prosecutions.  
The program also put forward improved notification of courts and crime victims; 
consultation with probation officers and defense counsel; and assistance for those 
victimized by chronic juvenile delinquents. The initiative encouraged greater use of 
victim impact statements, a process by which a person or persons most directly affected 
by the perpetrator’s actions to directly or indirectly address the trier of the fact during 
decision-making activity. The program was also designed to provide special services that 
                                                 





would lead to the improved diagnostic assessment, treatment planning, and continuous 
case management for offenders.102 
HSVJOP was geared toward youth with at least one record of adjudication for a 
serious offense and charged with a serious felony.103 Serious felonies included residential 
burglary, robbery, aggravated assault, sexual assault, and murder. Multiple jurisdictions 
used the program and each project had its own selection criteria in relation to these 
general guidelines. The HSVJOP lasted two years. Local prosecutors’ offices in thirteen 
jurisdictions implemented it in jurisdictions with populations ranging from five hundred 
thousand to five million.  
The HSVJOP was evaluated by the American Institutes for Research (AIR), a not 
for profit social science research organization, with the National Institute for Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention (NIJJDP), a U.S. DOJ research, development and 
evaluation agency.104 The AIR/NIJJDP report stated that the program was effective in 
addressing the issue of chronic juvenile delinquents. Specifically, the report found that 
prosecutors’ offices could effectively put into place programs targeting youth who were 
habitual serious and violent juvenile offenders.105 Note that these programs were 
prosecutorial and not preventative programs carried out by law enforcement agencies or 
juvenile probation departments. 
Key elements of successful targeted prosecution programs involved experienced 
prosecutors, sufficient resources for effective case preparation, continuity of prosecution 
in serious cases, and greater interaction with victims and witnesses. In some jurisdictions, 
targeted prosecutions programs also brought faster resolutions of chronic juvenile 
offender cases because habitual and serious offenders were prosecuted at a quicker pace. 
                                                 
102 Ruberta Cronin et al., Evaluation of the Habitual Serious and Violent Juvenile Offender Program, 
Final Report: Executive Summary (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Criminal Justice 
Reference Service, 1998), 1.  
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid., 7. 
 29 
In certain locations, these programs also lessened the severity of consequences through 
plea-bargaining. The targeted prosecution programs also brought more convictions.106 
However, there were some limitations to the programs. The AIR/NIJJDP report 
recommended that the mechanisms used to screen and determine cases suited for targeted 
prosecution should be given more attention during program design and implementation 
because linking targeted prosecution projects with special correctional efforts for youths 
being prosecuted for habitual and serious crimes is functional only in theory, and 
therefore difficult to put into practice.107 
The AIR/NIJJDP report highlighted four jurisdictions: Miami, Florida; 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Seattle, Washington; and Washington, DC. Miami’s HSVJOP 
project led to transfers of juveniles to adult court; however, the program did not reduce 
dismissal rates. Miami’s project increased vertical prosecutions and state continuances 
(rather than defense dismissals). 
The Milwaukee project was brought about increased transfers of juveniles into the 
adult court system and the imposition of more correctional (rather than probation) 
sentences. The number of charges also increased during case filings. Milwaukee’s project 
cases concluded earlier and involved less defense continuances. Juvenile offenders in 
Milwaukee were more likely to be vertically prosecuted, too. Milwaukee Assistant 
District Attorney David Robles attributed sentences given to juveniles in Milwaukee 
County adult courts to be more severe than sentences given to juveniles in juvenile court. 
He said that of the juveniles appearing in adult courts, forty percent were sent to adult 
prisons, thirty-six percent were sent to county jails, thirteen percent were given probation 
and jail terms, and less than ten percent were given probation. Robles said that most of 
these juveniles were male, seventeen years old, and had been arrested and charged at least 
ten times before the project’s cases.108 
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Seattle’s efforts did not intend for adult transfers and so the project focused on 
vertical prosecutions that brought lower dismissal rates and quicker dispositions. During 
the Washington, DC project, there were higher conviction rates and lower dismissal rates.  
However, the AIR/NIJJDP report concluded that in the four sites it studied, 
vertical prosecution was not successfully attained. This may have been caused by the 
program’s faulty screening process described above. Nevertheless, the sites acted as 
sufficient cross sections of the participants under the HSVJOP initiative because these 
sites contained demographically diverse populations, and they presented various statutory 
and procedural environments for the program to be implemented and evaluated.  
The AIR/NIJJDP report stated that the HSVJOP program was slow in getting 
started as it was too challenging to integrate with other prosecution services. The program 
was also criticized for being too small to serve all eligible offenders effectively and the 
AIR/NIJJDP report did not state how the HSVJOP reduced crime. The presumption here 
is that the incarceration bought about through the HSVJOP reduced crime. 
Reducing crime itself is one measure of a juvenile criminal justice program’s 
benefits, but there are many other measures of success. Increasingly, America has 
demanded evidence-based practices in determining the value of crime reduction 
programs. One measure of a best practice may be in reducing costs, as spending money 
on programs that prevent juvenile delinquency has been found to save “seven to ten 
dollars for every dollar invested”109 by reducing cost of incarcerating juveniles in adult 
prisons. Another gauge of a best practice deems that the most successful programs are 
those that prevent delinquent behaviors by emphasizing, “family interactions and 
teaching life skills to the adults who supervise and train at risk children.”110 
However, the most evidence-based comparison of juvenile delinquency reduction 
programs is the statistical meta-analysis (a systematic synthesis of quantitative research 
results) of program evaluations. Greenwood wrote that in theory a meta-analysis should 
be one of the best ways “to determine what to expect in the way of effectiveness, 
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particularly if it tests for any effect of timing, thus giving more weight to more recent 
evaluations.”111 Of course, once a program has demonstrated that it can be evaluated 
accurately, it follows that others can replicate that accuracy. Greenwood found that 
“meta-analysis is the best method for sorting this out,”112 but he warned that measuring 
“the effects of delinquency prevention programs is challenging because the behavior” 
that “programs attempt to change is often covert and the full benefits extend over long 
periods of time.”113 
James C. Howell’s and Mark W. Lipsey’s meta-analysis work found that the 
average juvenile justice programs had elements that improved youthful offender 
treatment and rehabilitation programs by focusing on developing effective combinations 
of services.114 In this context, best practice refers to a “differentiated set of program 
elements, many combinations of which are associated with positive outcomes.”115 
The major features of good juvenile delinquency treatment programs identified in 
Howell’s and Lipsey’s meta-analysis were the “effectiveness of the focus of a program” 
its service delivery; and some of the “characteristics of the juvenile clients,” as “some 
programs are more effective for high-risk juveniles than low-risk offenders.”116 They 
also found that the best delinquency prevention and juvenile justice system programs 
included:  
• Interpersonal skills training;  
• Behavior management and counseling;  
• Parent and family training;  
• Mentoring of the juvenile;  
• Drug and health education;  
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• Restitution;  
• Academic enhancement;  
• Intensive supervision; and  
• Employment training.117 
Howell and Lipsey warned that one must consider the empirical benefits of a 
program when considering the costs of crime prevention strategies, as well. Punishment 
alone may be one method of dealing with juvenile delinquency, but using intervention in 
a treatment setting—as opposed to a correctional setting—has been shown to be effective 
in creating changes in juvenile offenders because treatment addresses the multiple 
underlying problems that manifest themselves in the offenders’ communities, families, 
schools, and peer groups. 
Under the standard of preventing juvenile delinquency, rather than incarcerating 
juvenile offenders, one best practice in addressing habitual juvenile offenders that 
reduced the number of days that juveniles were incarcerated by sixty percent is the 
Oregon Social Learning Center’s Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care.  
The Oregon Social Learning Center, a non-profit research center dedicated to 
healthy child development and family functioning created its Multidimensional 
Treatment Foster Care (MTFC) Program as an “alternative to institutional, residential, 
and group care placement for teenagers with histories of chronic and severe criminal 
behavior,” using the MTFC Program “is a cost effective alternative to incarceration for 
adolescents who have problems with chronic antisocial behavior, emotional disturbance, 
and delinquency.”118 
In the MTFC program, “community foster families are recruited, trained, and 
closely supervised to provide adolescents with treatment and intensive supervision at 
home, in school, and in the community,”119 as well as giving positive reinforcement for 
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appropriate behavior; making mentoring adults available to juveniles within the program; 
and separation of program subjects from their delinquent peers.  
MTFC utilizes a behavior modification program by which youths in the program 
are provided with structured daily feedback. The MTFC program utilizes a behavior 
modification plan by which youths in the program are placed in foster homes for about 
180 days, during these six months the youths and their foster parents receive structural 
feedback through daily phone contact and weekly contact at parent meetings. The 
program emphasizes development of interpersonal skills and participation in sporting 
activities. Aftercare services remain in place for as long as the parents want. MTFC is a 
“community-based placement that can be used in lieu of residential or group care”120 and 
the program is less expensive than placement in institutional settings.  
When comparing MTFC to the HSVJOP, which in Milwaukee led to increased 
juvenile incarcerations, the costs of the foster program were less because foster care has 
shown itself to be cheaper than imprisonment. 
In summary, singling out juvenile offenders for scrutiny and applying the 
intelligence cycle to their activities may reduce crime. The question of how to winnow a 
serious habitual juvenile offender from the fold is of import. Law enforcement could do 
so by scrutinizing their own records to determine what juvenile offenders within their 
jurisdiction merit attention by using the HSVJOP’s criteria of youths with a juvenile or 
adult court record of one adjudication for a serious offense. 
The steps of the contemporary intelligence cycle—the tasking of criminal justice 
personnel to identify the habitual juvenile offender (requirements); the gathering of 
pertinent information about the offender (collection); the interpretation of data generated 
by collection activities (processing), the identifying of the data’s implications for wider 
judgments and contextual issues that the collected “raw” information is supposed to 
clarify (analysis) and giving the policy makers an intelligence product (dissemination)—
may lead to the singling out of the most serious juvenile offenders for juvenile justice 
system attention.  
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Regardless, if such attention brings a prosecution or enrollment in a behavior 
modification program, the information gathered and presented with the aid of the 
intelligence cycle would benefit the offender by calling him or her to account for his or 
her behavior. Let us not forget that Howell and Lipsey’s meta-analysis study showed that 
intervention has a greater effect on ending juvenile criminal careers121than incarceration. 
The next chapter will discuss the career criminal in the context of legislation, 
reporting crime, and crime control programs. 
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V. THE CAREER CRIMINAL 
The elements of crime are countless and the terms used to define their degrees are 
just as numerous. The use of terms, such as career criminal, professional criminal, 
habitual offender or serious offender, varies in context and definition. While scholars 
disagree, legislation and judicial decisions seek common ground.  
In spite of American efforts of crime control—mass incarceration, that of the 
1980s and 1990s, which is now being questioned—crime still occurs. Simply put, one 
becomes an offender by participating in crime and about fifteen percent of urban males 
are arrested for a serious crime (FBI Part I index offense) by the age of eighteen and 
somewhere between twenty-five to thirty-five percent of urban males will be arrested for 
a serious crime sometime in their lifetime.122 The most active ten percent of criminals 
offend at rates that may exceed 100 offenses per year, almost two crimes per week. Such 
gross characterizations need to be broken down in order to understand crime, to react to 
crime, and to create useful public policy to respond to crime. 
It is important to identify variables associated with the most serious offenders in 
order to anticipate future criminal activity; to improve the identification of serious 
offenders and thereby design programs and policies likely to be effective for these 
offenders; to assess the scale and extent of incarceration in order to make efficient use of 
limited prison space; and to create research programs that build on existing knowledge in 
order to create effective policies and crime control programs. 
Blumstein highlighted that the “four key dimensions that characterize criminal 
careers are: participation (the distinction between those who engage in crime and those 
who do not); frequency (the rate of criminal activity of those who offend); the seriousness 
of the offenses committed; and the length of time an offender is active.”123 While the 
most active criminals commit a variety of crimes, there is a tendency for some offenders 
to “repeat the same crime or to reiterate within a group of property crimes or violent 
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crimes”124 and Edelstein found that career criminals committed more crimes in their 
youth: the frequency of the offenses increases during a criminal’s teen years and declines 
as he or she (but mostly he) ages.125  
About half of those ever arrested during their lifetime were first arrested before 
the age of eighteen and participant rates of high school age males are influenced by 
various factors such as the type of the data used (aggregate statistics, official records, or 
self-reports), the type of crimes measured (Part I crimes versus status offenses), and the 
level of the subject’s involvement (police contact, arrest, referral to court, and or a 
conviction).126 Each factor reflects documentation of criminal justice contact suffered by 
juveniles, but for self-reporting. The spirit of the law versus the letter of the law is 
reflected in the final factor – a law enforcement officer’s discretion, a juvenile probation 
officer’s discretion, or a prosecutor’s discretion – and can be seen in decisions that result 
in the forwarding of the juvenile along the criminal justice system. 
The difference in criminal frequency rates amongst criminals can be attributed to 
the age of the offender at the beginning of a criminal career; drug use; employment; and 
previous criminal acts (whether reported or not)127 and the lengths of criminal careers 
vary with the age of the offender at the beginning of his career, the duration of the career, 
and the early termination of some careers.128 Many careers are short due to brief teenage 
adventures. The expected time remaining is a criminal career is five years for active 
offenders in their late teens while the expected time remaining for active offenders in 
their thirties is 10 years.129 These 10 years of criminal careers of those thirty-year-old 
offenders might exist because the termination of criminal careers in the early years of 
young offenders may leave the older offender group more densely populated with 
criminals who now have longer careers. It is safe to assume that those criminal who 
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started offending when they were young and who remain active in their thirties will have 
the lowest criminal career termination rates.  
While frequency—the number of crimes committed per year by an active offender 
—evokes an image of constant criminality, one must realize that at one extreme are 
offenders convicted or alleged to have committed only one offense and at the other 
extreme are career criminals who are seen as “dangerous, habitual, or chronic offenders 
who commit serious offenses with high frequency over extended periods of time.”130 
Blumstein called for studying the short careers of those who commit very few 
offenses because of the prudence in identifying factors that led to the end of such 
careers,131 and he found that these factors could be of great use in designing crime 
control policies that could include crime prevention, which may be achieved through the 
imposition of sanctions for deterrent purposes.132 
Crime control consists of dissuasion, restoration, and incapacitation. Deterring 
“actual and potential offenders by imposing punishment on identified offenders fulfills 
dissuasion.”133 Restoration in the form of rehabilitation is the changing of a criminal’s 
behavior. Incapacitation is the imprisonment of the offender. Career criminals, by the 
nature of their history, do not respond to deterrence, nor do they respond to the 
rehabilitative efforts of the criminal justice system. 
The duty of crime control is implicitly in the hands of the government, although 
London’s third Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Robert Peel, espoused the theory 
that the “police are the public and the public are the police.”134 That thought is still 
embraced by some of today’s prominent police executives, such as New York’s police 
commissioner, William Bratton.135  
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Efforts to control crime can be found in all branches of American government: 
laws created by its legislatures (legislative branch); investigations and arrests by law 
enforcement officers (executive branch); prosecutions by district attorneys or attorneys 
general (executive branch); adjudication by court (judicial branch); and rehabilitation—
probation or parole—or incapacitation through incarceration by the correctional system 
(executive branch). Academic research of the criminal justice system can assist in 
creating policy for these three branches of American government. 
Research on criminal careers tends to focus on three areas: the beginning of an 
offender’s criminal career; what crimes and criminal patterns have occurred; and when an 
offender stops committing crimes.136 There is a dearth of research on law enforcement’s 
use of career criminal programs; this may be due to faulty police presumptions about 
criminal career trajectories,137 if you lock them up and throw away the key, you have 
done your job. 
Regardless of the lack of research on the use of career criminals programs, 
American law enforcement addresses career criminals by using legislation aimed at 
stiffer penalties and enforcement programs. These penalties and programs use 
information about an offender’s past to inform decisions within the criminal justice 
system. Every stage of decision-making within the criminal justice system uses 
information about an individual’s criminal career. Law enforcement officers use this 
information when deciding whether to arrest. Prosecutors use it when deciding whether to 
move on a case presented by law enforcement. Judges use this information in setting a 
suspect’s pretrial release conditions and weighing the danger to a community when 
punishing a defendant.138 
Law enforcement decisions are based on the seriousness of the offense, the hostile 
behavior of the suspect, the victim’s preference, the relationship between the victim and 
the perpetrator (do they know each other or are they strangers to each other), the arresting 
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officer’s knowledge of the victim and the criminal, and the location of the crime (e.g. a 
low socioeconomic neighborhood). 
Prosecution decisions are based on the seriousness of the offense, the victim’s 
preference, the victim’s relationship with the defendant, and the quality of the evidence 
(physical and testimonial); all of which determine the strength of the case.  
Judicial decisions in determining pretrial release and sentencing are usually 
directed by established guidelines, which have been created in order to dispense fairness 
to defendants in similar circumstances.  
These facets of decision-making are the frame for the three-legged stool—
deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation—of crime control, and we shall see how 
such information has been used in dealing with career criminals. However, there are 
times when the age of the offender is a primary consideration in making decisions and 
creating policy in the criminal justice system. Career criminals have been depicted as 
dangerous or chronic offenders; they are those “who commit serious offenses with high 
frequency over extended periods of time,”139 whereas juveniles who do the same are 
deemed serious habitual offenders. 
As discussed in chapter one, Wolfgang defined chronic juvenile offenders as 
those had been arrested five or more times by the time, they turned eighteen years of age. 
He found that these chronic offenders made up only six percent of his Philadelphia 
cohort, but that they accounted for fifty-two percent of all the cohort’s arrests.140 Here we 
find the inconsistency of labels. While Wolfgang labeled his wards as chronic, Blumstein 
found that delinquency is more difficult to define: “it can refer to traditional youth 
crimes, such as truancy or underage drinking” or delinquency, “can refer to any crime 
committed by someone under the age of majority.”141 The worst label that the criminal 
justice system legislatively gives to juvenile offenders is serious habitual offender, not 
career criminal. 
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Adult career criminals are not serious habitual offenders in the eyes of the U.S. 
DOJ. The DOJ Serious Habitual Offender Comprehensive Action Program (SHOCAP) is 
a criminal justice system-wide approach to handling juveniles only; its Juvenile Serious 
Offender effort is a directed intervention program that obviously targets juveniles; and its 
HSVJOP does not focus on adults. Given the funding that the U.S. DOJ provides to state 
and local criminal programs, it bodes well for criminal justice agencies to abide by these 
definitions. 
However, what comes first, the research, the legislation, the funding, or the 
programs? Literature reviews on crime finds a focus on results: crime rates and 
incarceration rates. Whereas Blumstein studied the activities of those who offend by 
looking at those who commit crime, what crimes are committed, and how often crimes 
are committed. In doing so, Blumstein looked at the percentage of the population who 
committed crime and how they committed crimes. 
By examining the elemental components of career crime—participation, 
frequency, seriousness of crime, and criminal career length—a responsive criminal 
justice policy can be crafted. Criminal justice policy could focus on the prevention of 
one’s taking part in a criminal life, or crime’s frequency (the rate of criminal activity of 
those who are active in that lifestyle), or the seriousness of the offenses committed, or the 
offender’s career length. 
Partitioning these dimensions is important because the components themselves 
are the results of multiple factors and these factors may need different criminal justice 
system policies. If a response addresses participation, the reaction would be associated 
with efforts to prevent individuals from committing crimes. If a response focused on the 
frequency of crime, the seriousness of the offense, or a criminal career length, the 
reaction would be central to the day-to-day decisions within the criminal justice system in 
dealing with crime by using police and prosecutorial resources or with court 
adjudications or sentencing. 
Again, information is necessary in creating criminal justice system responses, and 
policy cannot escape counting crimes. Self-reports and official records are currently the 
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best available methods for obtaining longitudinal data on individual criminal careers. 
Self-reporting one’s own crime is likely to be affected by the significance and recency of 
the event, with more salient events to be remembered.142 These two methods for creating 
an inventory of criminal acts committed by an offender are subject to error: under and 
over self-reporting and the criminal justice system’s discretion in recording offender 
contacts. Self-reporting is subject to flawed recall or misrepresentation143 and official 
records show that there are few arrests compared to many crimes.144 
Self-reporting by inmates is questionable because of researchers’ inability to 
verify the number of crimes claimed. For example, inmates in California and Michigan 
who were active in robbery before their incarceration reported that they had committed 
fifteen to twenty robberies per year and inmates active in burglary in that same prisoner 
population reported that they had committed forty-five to fifty burglaries per year. These 
self-reports were not consistent with official tallies of crime in those two states. Whereas 
Texas inmates reported numbers closer to those of offenders still at large. Nevertheless, 
the “median offender commits only a handful of crimes per year, while a small 
percentage of offenders commit more than 100 crimes per year.”145 This finding is an 
important fact in developing crime control policies and programs that concentrate on 
career criminals.  
While law enforcement can target individuals, career criminals, before a crime, 
other agencies concentrate resources on places and behavior: high crime areas and certain 
types of offenses. Typically, career criminal units focus on the identification of career 
criminals and hopefully their incapacitation. The Washington, DC Metropolitan Police 
Department, the New York Police Department (NYPD), and the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
have used various methods in targeting career criminals for investigation. 
Washington, DC’s Metropolitan Police Department’s repeat offender program 
(ROP) focused on active felons. These felons were considered for surveillance by a panel 
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of police detectives. While surveillance of these offenders was ROP’s primary tactic, it 
yielded few arrests. DC Metro changed its tactics by adopting other methods: targeting 
the offender in a buy/bust narcotics operation, using informants to entice the offender into 
committing a crime (without entrapping the suspect), or locating the offender and 
arresting him/her on an existing arrest warrant.146 
The results of the ROP included an increase in ROP officers’ arrest of offenders 
with serious criminal histories, an increase in the seriousness of the charges in new cases, 
a greater likelihood of felony prosecutions of those arrested by ROP officers, and a 
decrease in the overall number of arrests by ROP officers.147 
The New York Police Department’s Career Criminal Command (CCC) was 
established in 1980 and approached career criminals with an effort to augment arrests of 
known career criminals by strengthening the cases against them. The effort began with a 
mutual definition of a career criminal by prosecutors and police. The CCC then focused 
on the pre-arrest and post-arrest status of these known criminals through maximum 
quality of evidence (testimonial and physical) that resulted in stronger sentences upon 
conviction. 
Using Wolfgang’s Philadelphia study, which showed that a small percentage of 
criminals committed a large percentage of crime, the CCC identified career criminals at 
large and created biographical files on each subject based on rap sheets, police reports, 
and modus operandi with a focus on weapons use, violence and criminal threats. 
The biographical file would be forwarded to prosecutors upon the arrest of the 
career criminal. The file would help prosecutors to determine whether to prosecute the 
case, whether or not to argue for release on bail, and in setting a priority for the case. 
The CCC would be responsible for pre-arrest surveillance and apprehension of 
targeted career criminals and post-arrest investigations. One target list of 1,100 subjects 
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in the 1980s was based on a criterion of two robbery arrests or one robbery arrest plus 
one arrest for violence within the prior three years. CCC detectives would take over the 
investigation of a patrol arrest of a targeted career criminal and seek additional witnesses 
and physical evidence. Detectives would also attempt to tie the career criminal in 
question to open cases. CCC detectives would proactively search for career criminals 
listed by their command in order to conduct surveillance of them. 
An analysis of the CCC by the NYPD, prosecutors, and judges found that the 
command had arrested fifty-nine percent of those listed as career criminals and that those 
defendants suffered a higher rate of indictments, felony charges and incarceration.148 
However, not only police departments used career criminal units, prosecutors used them 
as well. 
The United States Attorney’s office uses formal selection rules for assignment of 
cases to its career criminal units. A scale was developed that classified offenders on 
federal probation or parole. The scale considered the subject’s alcohol and or heroin use; 
the subject’s age at the time of the arrest in question; the length of the subject’s criminal 
career plus any arrests in the five years prior to the arrest (crime of violence, crimes 
against property, and or narcotics sales were given greater weight in this part of the 
analysis); the longest single term hat the subject ever served in custody; probation 
sentences; and whether the offense being considered by the U.S. Attorney’s career 
criminal unit is violent, a weapons violation, or a status violation (did it occur while on 
pretrial release, probation, parole, or military service). 
In conclusion, this paper focuses on applying the intelligence cycle to the career 
criminal before an arrest, before a prosecution, before adjudication, and before 
incarceration. However, the difficulty in targeting a career criminal is in finding that 
subject before he or she offends. More importantly, there is a need for the prosecutor and 
law enforcement to work together in identifying the serious repeat offenders who commit 
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a disproportionate amount of crime.149 The use of predictive policing, as described in the 
paragraphs above about Washington, DC’s ROP and New York City’s CCC, in targeting 
a known offender may be objectionable if he or she had shown no predisposition to 
commit a crime but commits a crime at the insistence of a police informant or an 
undercover police officer.150 The defense of entrapment is a response to this concern.  
The next chapter will explore how people think, how bureaucracies organize 
information, how intelligence agencies contemplate their mission by organizing 
information through the intelligence cycle and finish with a model for American law 
enforcement agencies to consider in using the intelligence cycle to deal with career 
criminals. 
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VI. A RECOMMENDATION 
Bostrom and Clawson theorized that people process the world around them 
through their senses and that their brains handle this information, which results in a 
“response to the situation.”151 They labeled the information taken in as input and the 
resulting behavior as output. Bostrom and Clawson further found that everyone has the 
“same brain circuits and sensory systems,”152 yet people behave differently in the same 
circumstances. These different reactions were explained through the way the mind 
processes the input received. 
This processing is the result of selecting and arranging the way “we see 
reality”153 by using a “mental pattern or template”154 that allows understanding. Bostrom 
and Clawson called this framing, and they wrote that people establish their framing with 
beliefs and criteria.155 They found that beliefs are what people “think is true or possible 
in the world” and criteria are “the standards by which (people) evaluate (their) 
experience(s).”156 We shall see how the first step of the intelligence cycle—requirements 
—uses framing to initiate the process. 
Laudon and Laudon looked at the way in which bureaucracies organized 
information and described a pyramid with transactional processing systems supporting 
management information systems, then decision support systems, with executive 
information systems at its peak.157  
Transactional processing systems are “information processing systems for 
business transactions involving the collection, modification, and retrieval of all 
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transactional data.”158 Management information systems are “computerized databases of 
financial information organized and programed in such a way that it produces regular 
reports on operations for every level of management in a company.”159 Decision support 
systems are “any information system that supports business or organizational decision 
making activities”160 in an organization. And executive information systems “facilitate 
and support senior executive decision making needs.”161 
This pyramid does not reflect the intelligence cycle but its references to databases 
and the implications about its users logically shadow intelligence agency operations in 
that transactions are similar to intelligence agency contacts within communities of 
interest, and information and support systems in businesses and intelligence agencies are 
used to create reports for use by both organizations’ personnel and leadership.  
As shown in Chapter I, intelligence cycles generally have individual components 
such as direction, collection, analysis, processing, and dissemination.162 The intelligence 
cycle generally begins with intelligence requirements, which are information needs. In 
some instances intelligence requirements result from “continuous evaluation and review 
or the requirements may result from planning and direction,”163 and some agencies, such 
as the DHS, have standing requirements based on the nation’s needs.164  
The FBI’s mission “includes protecting the United States from terrorist attacks; 
protecting the country from foreign intelligence or espionage operations, cyber-based or 
high tech crimes; fighting public corruption; protecting the civil rights and liberties of 
citizens; fighting international criminal organizations that threaten national security; 
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combating white collar crimes, as well as violent crimes of significance; supporting 
international, federal, state, and local partners in the fight against crime, and using 
technology to improve the chances of success.”165 
The FBI’s intelligence cycle is used as a process of developing “unrefined data 
into polished intelligence”166 for the use of policymakers. As stated in chapter two its 
intelligence cycle contains six steps: “requirements, planning and direction, collection, 
processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination.”167 The FBI’s 
intelligence cycle requirements are “identified information needs, which are established 
by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)”168 with the input from the president, the 
White House homeland security advisors, the U.S. Attorney General and the Director of 
the FBI.169 
The FBI uses planning and direction to manage its intelligence cycle; “interviews, 
technical and physical surveillances, human source operations, searches, and liaison 
relationships”170 to collect the information necessary to for analysis; “decryption, 
language translation, and data entry”171 to process the information; evaluations of the 
information’s credibility to analyze the information thus changing it into intelligence; and 
dissemination to distribute the intelligence. 
The CIA’s mission is to “preempt threats and to further United States national 
security objectives by collecting intelligence that matters, producing objective all-source 
analysis, conducting effective covert action as directed by the president, and safeguarding 
the secrets that help keep the nation safe.”172 Again, referring to chapter two, the CIA 
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intelligence cycle contains five steps: “planning and direction, collection, processing, 
analysis and production, and dissemination.”173 The CIA’s Collection Management 
Officers “establish and identify intelligence collection requirements, validate sources and 
evaluate intelligence production of human sources,”174 its National Clandestine Service 
and the Directorate of Science and Technology collects information, and its Directorate 
of Intelligence creates the intelligence product.175 
The DHS intelligence enterprise mission “is to provide valuable, actionable 
intelligence and intelligence-related information for and among the National leadership, 
all components of DHS, (its) federal partners, state, local, territorial, tribal, and private 
sector customers.”176 
The DHS intelligence cycle consists of five steps: “planning and direction, 
collection, processing, analysis, and production and dissemination.”177 The DHS stands 
separate from the FBI and the CIA and “does not generally engage in traditional foreign 
intelligence collection activities, such as imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, human 
intelligence, measurement and signatures intelligence, and foreign open source 
intelligence.”178   
Rather than using an intelligence requirement as the FBI and the CIA does, the 
DHS has “key intelligence questions”179 which are “shaped by client needs, White House 
administration and DHS leadership priorities, and resources.”180 The DHS qualifies these 
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key intelligence questions chronologically: imminent threats to the homeland, planned 
threats, and emerging threats.181 
All three agencies use the intelligence cycle with the FBI using six steps as 
compared to the CIA’s and DHS’s five steps. The DHS makes an effort to distance itself 
from conventional intelligence work, and the CIA is prohibited from conducting its 
operations in the homeland, unless it is recruiting a foreign national. Table 1 shows the 
elements of the intelligence cycle as described by the three intelligence agencies. 
Table 1.   Comparison of Intelligence Cycles 
 Analysis Collection Direction Dissemination Exploitation Planning Processing Production Requirements 
DHS X X X X  X X X  
FBI X X X X X X X X X 
CIA X X X X  X X X  
 
Using Bostrom and Clawson’s framing—beliefs and criteria—the three 
intelligence agencies can be subject to the viewpoints and standards of the President of 
the USA, his or her national security advisors, the U.S. Attorney General, the Director of 
National Intelligence, the Director of the CIA, the Director of the FBI, the Secretary of 
the DHS, and CIA Collection Management Officers, among others. 
This paper has looked at the intelligence cycle as it is used by American 
intelligence agencies and at career criminals. This paper’s literature review did not find 
any American law enforcement agencies using the intelligence cycle to address the career 
criminal. This paper concludes with a recommended model using the intelligence cycle to 
address the career criminal.  
Using the FBI’s intelligence cycle’s six steps – requirements, planning and 
direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and 
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dissemination182—rather than the CIA’s or the DHS’s five steps because the FBI’s first 
step—requirements—helps a law enforcement agency easily stay on task.  
The first step of the model (requirements) would identify the subject of the 
intelligence cycle: a career criminal Using New York State’s persistent felony offender 
definition (a person “convicted of a felony having previously been convicted of two or 
more” felonies183) would make the subject of the cycle a person who has three felony 
convictions. While this paper considered using the intelligence cycle on juveniles in the 
fourth chapter, this model would focus on adults only as Howell and Lipsey’s meta-
analysis study have shown that intervention has a greater effect on ending juvenile 
criminal careers184 and the goal of this model is incarceration of adult career criminals. 
Another requirement qualification would be residence or know whereabouts. This could 
be determined through arrest records or law enforcement reports. A subject’s residence or 
habitual presence in a law enforcement agency’s jurisdiction or neighboring region would 
qualify a subject for consideration. Therefore, the requirement criteria can be met through 
the number of felony convictions (three) and the location of the subject. As described in 
chapter four, consideration must be given to the NYPD’s CCC wherein local prosecutors 
and the police agreed to a mutual definition of a career criminal. Also, a spike in crime, 
such as robberies or burglaries, may temporarily narrow the requirements in that the first 
step may include known robbers or burglars who frequent the area where the spike 
occurred or is occurring. 
The second step of the model (planning and direction) would begin to be satisfied 
with a mission statement, stating the purpose of the operation (as described in chapter 
two), and furthered with an identified chain of command. The model could be 
incorporated into an agency’s operations or investigations division as a distinct and 
separate unit, and not a function that would be a duty to be considered by multiple 
personnel. Planning can be directed through identified goals with concrete deadlines. 
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Constant evaluation can be used at this point, and in the next step, to determine if an 
identified subject should be the focus of the intelligence cycle as variables, such as the 
subject’s death or incarceration for another crime, might remove the subject from 
consideration. 
The third step of the model (collection) can also be dealt with in the fashion of the 
NYPD’s CCC in that subjects meeting the model’s criteria (three felony convictions) who 
frequent a law enforcement agency’s area of responsibility could be identified and 
biographical case files could be established using open and closed sources to populate the 
files’ data. Using the Federal Bureau of Investigations tactics of interviewing the subject, 
his family, known associates, informants, and probation and parole officers and 
conducting surveillances of the subject can further the third step.  
The fourth step of the model (processing and exploitation) should follow a 
rigorous standard of data entry in order to maintain records that are easy to maintain, 
access, and use. 
The fifth step of the model (analysis and production) may overlap the second step 
(planning and direction) and the third step (collection) as analysis of the information 
about a subject may lead to new demands for more information about the subject. Once 
an analysis is concluded, the resulting intelligence product is ready for the sixth step of 
the model (dissemination).  
Care should be given to considering whether to distribute the information agency 
wide or unit wide. Once the information is disseminated, the agency should make an 
effort to locate the career criminal who is the subject of the agency’s intelligence cycle 
and determine how to proceed in the matter. Consideration should be given to the 
Washington DC Metropolitan Police Department’s ROP wherein surveillance was 
deemed inefficient and arresting the subject on existing warrants brought closure to the 
case file. 
In conclusion, it is well established in criminological and sociological literature 
that a small number of criminals is responsible for a large number of crimes and that a 
law enforcement agency’s focus on career criminals has resulted in the incarceration of 
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those habitual offenders. However, there has been no discussion about using the 
intelligence cycle to focus a law enforcement agency’s efforts on the career criminal. 
This paper is the beginning of that discussion. 
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